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Abstract
Although deep learning has shown great success in re-
cent years, researchers have discovered a critical flaw
where small, imperceptible changes in the input to the sys-
tem can drastically change the output classification. These
attacks are exploitable in nearly all of the existing deep
learning classification frameworks. However, the suscep-
tibility of deep sparse coding models to adversarial exam-
ples has not been examined. Here, we show that classifiers
based on a deep sparse coding model whose classification
accuracy is competitive with a variety of deep neural net-
work models are robust to adversarial examples that effec-
tively fool those same deep learning models. We demon-
strate both quantitatively and qualitatively that the robust-
ness of deep sparse coding models to adversarial examples
arises from two key properties. First, because deep sparse
coding models learn general features corresponding to gen-
erators of the dataset as a whole, rather than highly dis-
criminative features for distinguishing specific classes, the
resulting classifiers are less dependent on idiosyncratic fea-
tures that might be more easily exploited. Second, because
deep sparse coding models utilize fixed point attractor dy-
namics with top-down feedback, it is more difficult to find
small changes to the input that drive the resulting represen-
tations out of the correct attractor basin.
1. Introduction
With their strong and steadily improving performance
on image classification tasks, deep feed-forward convolu-
tional networks (DCNs) are now ubiquitous in virtually all
computer vision and machine learning challenges. How-
ever, overwhelming evidence shows that DCNs have at least
one major flaw: they are susceptible to adversarial attacks.
Researchers are able to make specially crafted “adversar-
ial perturbations” that when added to a correctly-classified
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image, produce an image that appears semantically indis-
tinguishable from the original yet are confidently misclassi-
fied by DCN models [1, 2]. In many cases, these adversar-
ial perturbations can be added to any image within a class
to cause the DCN to misclassify the image. Even more
alarming, adversarial perturbations are commonly transfer-
able across DCN model architectures [1–3]. In an age in
which autonomous cars are ever closer to entering the con-
sumer market, in which deep learning is common in medical
applications, and in which facial recognition is used for se-
curity purposes, the flaw posed by adversarial examples can
have devastating effects if used maliciously. Moreover, at-
tempts to mitigate the problem of adversarial examples have
largely failed or render established models significantly less
effective [4, 5]. In fact, in practice, increasing robustness to
adversarial examples in DCN models necessarily reduces
classification performance [4, 5].
In our work, we sought to develop a framework that
would be immune to adversarial attack while maintaining
a high level of classification performance. In particular,
our goal was to mitigate the risk of a neural network to
the transfer of adversarial example attacks and low-pass
filtering attacks that have been shown to be effective ad-
versaries against deep feedforward networks [1, 2, 4]. We
believe that demonstrating robustness is an important step
forward in computer vision and machine learning research
and illustrate a thorough process of testing and experimen-
tation in the body of this paper. As a result of our explo-
ration and analysis, we found that every model we tested
was susceptible to transferable adversarial examples, except
one. This model, deep sparse coding (DSC) [6], takes a
novel, biologically-inspired approach to machine learning,
and was immune to these transferable adversarial examples
generated to attack other deep learning architectures. Fur-
thermore, we found, and illustrate in our results, that the
DSC model’s representation of input is invariant to small
perturbations. This robustness stems from the model’s ten-
dency to observe semantically meaningful features of an im-
age, in contrast with the high frequency features that have
little or no semantic meaning to humans used by the con-
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ventional DCN classifiers.
2. Background
2.1. Single-layer sparse coding
To introduce the concept of deep sparse coding, we
first consider a single-layer of sparse coding. Intuitively,
a single-layer of sparse coding requires learning a set of
relatively low-dimensional, nearly orthogonal bases, with
the set of all such bases forming an overcomplete dictio-
nary that has been optimized for parsimoniously encoding
any input drawn from the same distribution on which the
model has been trained. The fully trained system acts as an
autoencoder that is able to infer a sparse representation of
any given input x which can in turn be used to reconstruct
x. From a learned dictionary, the sparse coding algorithm
attempts to infer the optimal basis in which to project the
input by maximizing reconstruction fidelity while using as
few basis vectors as possible.
More formally, we can pose the sparse coding problem
as follows: given a set of inputs from some input distribu-
tion x1, . . . ,xn ∼ X with associated sparse representations
a1, . . . ,an, which we call activation vectors, sparse coding
attempts to minimize the average mean squared error of the
reconstructions of xi using ai and a dictionary Φ. Addi-
tionally, the ai must be sparse. Mathematically, inferring a
sparse representations is a minimization problem:
min
Φ
n∑
i=1
min
ai
1
2
‖xi − Φai‖22 + λ ‖ai‖0 (1)
where λ is the sparsity penalty parameter. Note that Φai
represents the reconstruction of xi and ‖·‖k represents the
`k norm.
The way in which we solve for an appropriate activation
vector for each x is inspired by neural biological processes.
We represent the internal state of the model with a mem-
brane potential vector u associated with the activations. We
can compute a by a simple thresholding function:
am =
{
um − c um ≥ c
0 otherwise.
(2)
where c is the thresholding constant.
To minimize reconstruction error while maintaining a
desired sparsity, we use a technique known as the locally
competitive algorithm [7], allowing our sparse representa-
tion to evolve over time as a dynamical system. We wish to
minimize the energy J of our system, which we define as
the mean squared error of the reconstruction and a sparsity
cost penalty ‖a‖1. Formally:
J =
1
2
‖x− Φa‖22 + λ ‖a‖1 . (3)
Note that we use an `1 norm as an approximation for the `0
norm of the activation vector to make the system differen-
tiable. We can express the time evolution rule as a differen-
tial equation obtained by taking the negative gradient of the
energy J with respect to a,
u˙ = −u + ΦTx− [ΦTΦa− a] (4)
which can be described as the combination of three intuitive
components. The −u term acts as the decay component
of the system, thus slowly decreasing the potential of each
neuron over time. If an active neuron is not continuously
excited, then it will quickly fall below threshold and deacti-
vate. The ΦTx term “charges up” each of the neurons, ex-
citing neurons whose features effectively match the input.
The [ΦTΦa − a] term acts as an inhibitory signal, caus-
ing neurons that explain a similar component of the data to
compete, thus allowing only the neurons that “best” explain
the data to remain active. Rozell et al. [7] proves that this
dynamical system converges to the optimal solution to the
energy function.
2.2. Multi-layer (deep) sparse coding
Analogous to deep feed-forward models, deep sparse
coding simply adds more hidden layers between the input
and output layers, where each hidden layer attempts to re-
construct the layer immediately below it. However, in con-
trast to conventional deep learning models, the data con-
nections are not simply unidirectional, forward connections
from one layer to the next. Instead, deep sparse coding inte-
grates multiple highly recurrent connections at every level,
i.e., bottom-up input, lateral, and top-down feedback sig-
nals. The top-down feedback connections reinforce a stable
and self-consistent representation of the data at each layer.
To illustrate the necessity of top-down feedback, con-
sider that a typical feed-forward network might activate
multiple “good” explanations of the data. For example, the
neurons in the early layers of a model only perceive a small
patch of the input due to their local and limited receptive
fields. These neurons can easily observe cat-like features
and dog-like on the same input. A feed-forward model
might encode this input by activating both neurons that re-
spond to cat-like features and those that respond to dog-like
features. This is because it is nearly impossible for bottom-
up and lateral processes to “know” which low-level feature
should be assigned to one shape vs. another. Thus, feedback
projections from higher-level regions would be necessary to
account for our visual abilities in all but the simplest of cir-
cumstances [8]. On the other hand, consider the case when
a higher-level neuron that activates on images of dogs be-
comes active in the DSC model. If the model had learned
that observing a dog reduces the probability of observing a
cat, then the top-down feedback from the higher-level dog
neuron will inhibit the neurons that respond to cat-like fea-
2
tures and would reinforce the neurons that respond to dog-
like features.
Thus, top-down feedback provides an effective method
to converge on a confident and self-consistent representa-
tion of the input. The DSC model formulates top-down
feedback as follows: Let uL represent the internal state of
layer L. Let the residual rL+1 of layer L + 1’s reconstruc-
tion of layer L be defined:
rL = uL − ΦL+1aL+1 (5)
The uL term is forced to “conform” to layer L+ 1’s re-
construction of it by modifying our time evolution function
of uL to continually reduce the residual of the higher-level
reconstruction:
u˙L = −uL + ΦTx− [ΦTΦaL − aL]− rL (6)
3. Methodology
In this paper, we begin by defining a binary classifica-
tion task that will be attacked using adversarial examples.
We chose the binary classification task of face identification
as this is an important domain where a machine learning
model should be robust. The face ID application will be ap-
plied to a set of deep feed-forward convolutional networks
as well as on the deep sparse coding framework. Earlier
work on the deep sparse coding framework used the exam-
ple of “Halle Berry” face detection [6] and thus we con-
tinue on with this theme. We first demonstrate that we can
train a number of DCNs that can accurately distinguish be-
tween images of Halle Berry from our dataset and images
that are not of Halle Berry. Next, we exploit the learned
“Halle Berry neuron” in the DSC model, i.e., a neuron anal-
ogous to the neuron in the human brain identified by [9] that
responds to the multimodal “concept” of Halle Berry. After
training the DCN models, we show that we can generate ad-
versarial examples from our holdout set that transfer across
DCN architectures using established techniques. Finally,
we show that these adversarial examples fail to transfer to
the DSC model.
3.1. Dataset
We use a subset of the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW)
dataset [10] augmented with images of Halle Berry. The
dataset consists of photographs of faces from the web de-
tected by the Viola-Jones face detector. In total, there are
370 images of Halle Berry, scraped from IMDB, and a total
of 5,763 images consisting of 2,189 unique people. Each
image is 64 × 64 pixels, each with 3 color channels. We
segment the data into 4,519 training images, 1094 valida-
tion images, and 150 holdout images for evaluating our fi-
nal models. We use 150 holdout images which includes
75 images of Halle Berry and 75 images of other people.
Each of these holdout images are altered to make the vari-
ants of the dataset as described in later sections, including
the adversarial dataset, the low-pass filtered dataset, and the
Gaussian noisy dataset. See Figure 1 for a sample of the
dataset and its variants. As a note, all figures in this paper
are best viewed in color.
3.2. Deep feed-forward convolutional network mod-
els
Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNs) that have
been pre-trained on large image datasets such as ImageNet
[11] and then fine-tuned on the target dataset have been
shown to have impressive classification performance on
several datasets of limited size [12, 13]. Thus, we initial-
ized several state-of-the-art DCN architectures (ResNet50
[14], InceptionV3 [15], VGG16 [16], MobileNetV2 [17],
DenseNet121 [18]) with weights trained on ImageNet [14–
20] and then fine-tuned these DCNs to distinguish between
images of Halle Berry and images of “other” faces. We
used the Keras [20] framework on top of TensorFlow [19]
to build the models.
3.3. Deep sparse coding model
We use the DSC model built and trained by Kim et al.
described in [6]. The model attempts to reconstruct two
modalities using a single shared top-level hidden layer. The
two modalities are a 64× 64 color image of a person’s face
and a 128 × 16 grayscale image of the person’s name, ren-
dered in 20 point Arial font. The bi-modality of the model
with a shared P1 layer (see Figure 2) encourages the model
to encode an image of a person and an image of their name
with the same representation. We show that this feature en-
courages the model to learn high-level features including a
“Halle Berry neuron”, i.e., a single neuron which appears
to encode both images of Halle Berry and of her name.
The model is implemented using PetaVision [21], an open-
source accelerated neuromorphic computing framework.
The full model is depicted in Figure 2. The model con-
sists of two vision-specific layers, V1 and VP1, and one
text-specific layer, T1. These recurrent layers are connected
through the top-level layer, P1. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of the model, see [6].
The DSC model does not perform classification explic-
itly. Rather, it generates a sparse representation of the input
in its P1 layer. For classification, we train a linear support
vector machine (SVM) to take input from the P1 layer acti-
vations associated with a given image and output a label.
3.4. Transferable adversarial examples
We demonstrate that transferable adversarial examples,
i.e., adversarial examples that generalize across multiple
DCN architectures, do not generalize to the DSC model.
To generate an adversarial example for input x on classifier
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Figure 1. Images from the holdout dataset and the corresponding alterations. In each row, the left three faces are of “other” (non-Halle
Berry), and the right three faces are of Halle Berry. From top to bottom: original, adversarial, Gaussian noise, low-pass filter. The noise to
the left of each non-original image shows the difference between that image and the corresponding original. The noise has been translated
so that a pixel with no change is gray with a value 0.5. The noise is scaled by a factor of 10 in order to increase visibility. While upon
close inspection the alternations are visible, each altered image is nearly indistinguishable identical to the original image.
Figure 2. Deep sparse coding (DSC) model from Kim et al. [6]
kˆ, we wish to find perturbation η such that kˆ(x) 6= kˆ(x+η)
subject to the constraint that ‖η‖∞ is sufficiently small. We
generate adversarial examples using an iterative version of
the fast gradient sign method [2] (IFGSM). Let J(x, y) be
the classification loss function given input x and ground-
truth label y. Beginning from the original input x∗0 = x, we
describe the algorithm as follows:
x∗i+1 = x
∗
i + ε sign∇xJ(x∗i , y) (7)
Low-pass filtering has been shown to reduce classifica-
tion performance on DCN architectures [4]. To demonstrate
that the DSC model does not rely on high-frequency noise
to classify images, we run each holdout image through a
low-pass filter to generate a fourth dataset.
Samples of these datasets are shown in Figure 1.
4. Experiments and results
We first illustrate the responses of the Halle Berry neu-
ron. To demonstrate the DSC model’s resistance to trans-
ferable adversarial examples, we evaluate the DSC model
against analogous DCN models by comparing Halle-Berry-
identification performance on original images, adversarial
images, Gaussian noisy images, and low-pass filtered ver-
sions. We examine the internal state of the DSC model to
identify the properties of the DSC model that provide its
robustness.
4.1. Representation of Halle Berry
We observe a single “Halle Berry neuron”, which we call
N-326 due to its index in the DSC model. To demonstrate
the selectivity of N-326, we compare the average activation
of all P1 neurons over all images in the training set, and over
images of Halle Berry in the training set. We plot these radi-
ally in Figure 3. The average activation of N-326 on images
of Halle Berry is significantly stronger than the average ac-
tivation produced by other faces, suggesting that this neuron
activates strongly and selectively in response to an image of
Halle Berry. In fact, thresholding N-326 yields a classifi-
cation performance of nearly 85% on the holdout dataset.
Thus, N-326 acts as a somewhat effective indicator of im-
ages of Halle Berry. Additionally, after training an SVM on
the full P1 layer to distinguish images of Halle Berry from
other faces, we examine the weights, which are plotted in
Figure 4. The weight associated with N-326 is nearly twice
4
Figure 3. Average activations of P1 layer over the training set.
Standard deviations are plotted with a dotted black line. In red:
average response over all images of Halle Berry. In blue: aver-
age response over all other faces. On average, the P1 layer has a
strong spike on N-326 for Halle Berry images and comparatively
weak activations to tther faces. The average activations over all
other faces is relatively uniform. Both graphs are plotted on the
same scale.
the second-highest weight, further suggesting that N-326 is
the strongest linear indicator of Halle Berry.
4.2. Comparison of models
We compare robustness by measuring the performance
of each model on the holdout datasets. We entertain the
possibility that any distortion of an image might cause a
model to be unable to identify any particular features that
correlate strongly with images of Halle Berry or of other
faces, which would force the network to guess randomly.
Thus, we control for the effects of the distortion by run-
ning the model on the input with added Gaussian noise with
Figure 4. Positive weights of an SVM trained to classify images
as either “Halle Berry” or “other” from the sparse P1 layer rep-
resentation of each image. Importantly, the strongest positive
weight corresponds to N-326, indicating that this neuron acts as
the strongest linear indicator of Halle Berry. Since none of the
negative weights have a magnitude close to that of the weight that
corresponds to N-326, we omit them to improve the clarity of the
diagram.
Figure 5. Accuracy scores of the various models on the in blue:
original images, in green: Gaussian-noisy images, in orange: low-
pass filtered images, and in red: adversarial images. Note that we
use the DenseNet121 model to generate the adversarial examples,
which is why its classification accuracy on the adversarial exam-
ples is zero. We see that the performance of all DCN models drops
significantly on adversarial examples whereas the performance of
the DSC model is invariant to the described minor alterations.
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the same mean and standard distribution as the adversarial
noise. The comparative accuracies are plotted in Figure 5.
Note that the performance of the DenseNet121 model on the
adversarial examples is shown for reference, however, since
the DenseNet121 model is used as a whitebox with which
to generate adversarial examples, the performance on ad-
versarial examples is expected to be near-zero and orders of
magnitude smaller than the performance of the other DCN
architectures on the transferred adversarial examples, cor-
responding to a blackbox attack.
The classification performances of the respective models
demonstrate the robustness of the DSC model to transfer-
able adversarial examples. The four applicable DCN mod-
els (ResNet50, InceptionV3, VGG16, and MobileNetV2)
perform significantly worse on the transferred adversarial
examples than on the original and Gaussian noisy images,
yet the difference in the performance of the DSC model is
negligible between the original and adversarial inputs.
Furthermore, the classification performance of the DCN
models decreased on images after processing them with a
low-pass filter. However, as shown by Figure 5 the perfor-
mance of the DSC model is invariant to a low-pass filter.
4.3. Invariance of representation
ResNet Inception VGG MobileNet DSC
δα 0.44 0.08 0.59 0.68 0.05
δη 0.34 0.08 0.42 0.69 0.04
δ` 0.39 0.13 0.44 0.46 0.04
Table 1. Distance metric between hidden-layer representation of
original images and adversarial images (δα), Gaussian noisy im-
ages (δη), and low-pass filter images (δ`). The exact metric is
described below. Deep sparse coding representations of adversar-
ial, noisy, and low-pass filter images are significantly more similar
than the corresponding representations by DCN models.
To show that the DSC model is resistant to minor high-
frequency perturbations, we extract and plot the activation
of the strongest linear indicator of Halle Berry, N-326, on
the 75 holdout images of Halle Berry and the 75 holdout im-
ages of other. We provide three graphs, placed adjacently,
that show the N-326 activation on the original images, the
adversarial images, and the low-pass filter images, respec-
tively. These graphs are shown in Figure 6. Adversarial
perturbations and low-pass filtering have little effect on the
activation of N-326. It follows that any linear classifier that
relies heavily on N-326, such as the SVM we use to classify
the images, should be resistant to these minor perturbations,
including alterations that prove adversarial in feedforward
DCNs.
We further examine the P1 representation of images
across the original images, adversarial perturbations, and a
low-pass filter. In Figure 8, we plot the P1 activations of a
representative image of Halle Berry (top) and of other (bot-
tom). The representation of each image is nearly identical
across the alterations. In other words, these minor perturba-
tions do not appear to affect the entire P1 representation of
an image.
These observations generalize to the entire holdout
dataset. We compare the top-level hidden-layer represen-
tation of each original input image with the corresponding
representation of the adversarial, Gaussian noisy, and low-
pass filter images. As a measure, we compute the similarity
between the neuron activations in the hidden layer imme-
diately below the output layer in all networks. In the DSC
model, we observe the P1 layer activations when computing
the similarity metric. To control for the various distributions
of neuron activations across networks when measuring sim-
ilarity, we compute the average difference between the neu-
ron activations over the average standard deviation of the
neuron activations. Shown in Table 1, we demonstrate that
the DSC model has a significantly more similar represen-
tations across the original, adversarial, and low-pass filter
images than the DCN models we trained. Thus, minor per-
turbations to the input do not affect the internal representa-
tion of the image in our P1 layer.
For completeness, we include representative examples of
the reconstructions of the inputs from the three datasets:
original, adversarial, and low-pass filter. As illustrated by
Figure 7, there is little, if any, noticeable difference across
the reconstructions of the images in each dataset.
4.4. Limitations
We believe that deep sparse coding makes an important
step forward towards the development of machine learning
models that are fully robust to adversarial examples. How-
ever, as with any novel approach, deep sparse coding has
not yet been tested on many datasets.
While we show that transferable adversarial examples
generated using the iterative fast gradient sign method do
not transfer to the DSC model, we do acknowledge that the
DSC model is susceptible to adversarial attacks. This is
no surprise since all visual recognition systems (including
biological ones) will eventually change their classification
given a strong enough perturbation to the input signal. Since
observing the gradient of the DSC model is non-trivial, we
do not perform a direct gradient-based attack on the DSC
model, despite the possibility that an effective one might
exist. However, we are able to estimate the gradient of the
model by making single-pixel changes to a given image and
aggregating them to construct a first-order estimation of the
gradient. These examples prove effective against the DSC
model and their properties should be examined in the fu-
ture. This paper, however, still presents an important result:
the DSC model is not susceptible to transferable adversarial
examples that effectively target DCN models.
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Figure 6. The activation strength of the N-326 neuron on each holdout image, compared across the variants of the datasets. The left graph
shows the N-326 activation on each in blue: original image of Halle Berry and in orange: of people other than Halle Berry. The center
and right graphs show the same, but on the adversarial copies and on the low-pass filter copies, respectively. N-326 activates strongly on
images of Halle Berry and weakly on images of other. The N-326 activation remains invariant across adversarial perturbations and low-pass
filtering.
Figure 7. Representative examples of reconstructions of Halle
Berry faces and corresponding alterations. The images provided
as input to the model are shown on the top row. The bottom row
features the model’s reconstruction of each image. For each face,
from left to right: original, adversarial, and low-pass filter.
5. Conclusion
We show that the deep sparse coding model is resistant
to transferable adversarial attacks that harshly drop perfor-
mance of state-of-the-art DCN models. To demonstrate
this, we build state-of-the-art DCN classifiers that apply
transfer learning to separate images into the categories of
Halle Berry and other. We apply the iterative fast gradient
sign method to the DenseNet model to generate adversarial
examples, and then show that these adversarial examples
transfer more effectively than random-noise perturbations
to other DCN models. We then show that the DSC model
achieves the same classification rate on adversarial exam-
ples and low-pass filter images as the original unperturbed
images. Additionally, we show that the internal DSC repre-
sentation of each image is invariant to minor perturbations.
Finally, we acknowledge that adversarial examples exist for
the DSC model, but that traditional transfer attacks fail on
the DSC model.
At a high level, we demonstrate that the deep sparse cod-
ing model relies on features that are different than those
relied upon by DCN models, which has important impli-
cations for the field of adversarial machine learning. De-
spite the fact that the DSC model is vulnerable to direct ad-
versarial attacks, if an attacker does not have access to the
specific model, an attack may be difficult to perform. For
example, an adversary attempting to fool a self-driving car
without access to the model would not be able to apply a
standard adversarial example transfer attack. A malicious
doctor could not apply a transfer attack to fool the model
into identifying a disease from an X-ray that is not present.
We show that the DSC model is significantly more resis-
tant to high-frequency alterations of the data (such as Gaus-
sian noise and DCN adversarial examples) than traditional
DCN models. As such, the model may be especially ef-
fective in environments in which high-frequency noise oc-
curs frequently. Furthermore, we show that a low-pass filter
does not affect the DSC model’s internal representation of
the data, suggesting that the DSC model relies on lower-
frequency features than DCN models.
In our future work, we plan to further investigate deep
sparse coding models, especially to answer questions such
as: what particular attacks are effective against DSC mod-
els, do there exist universal adversarial examples as found
in DCN models [3], and do adversarial examples effectively
transfer across separate DSC models?
In conclusion, we believe that the DSC model provides
an important step forward in the field of computer vision
and machine learning, and warrants further research. Our
project addresses a major flaw in the traditional deep learn-
ing methodologies and offers an effective alternative. Our
hope is to see further research on neurally inspired models
and their applications in the pattern recognition community.
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